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Justice Blackmun and Preclusion In the
State-Federal Context
Karen Nelson Moore*
I.

Introduction

Justice Blackmun's contributions to the development of the law
in numerous areas demonstrate a commitment to individual rights,
an appreciation for the real effects of a decision on the lives of the
litigants, and a sense of history. These characteristics are reflected in
a series of opinions written by Justice Blackmun a decade ago in the
field of preclusion or res judicata, addressing whether state court adjudication should have preclusive effects on subsequent federal court
litigation. Although several of these opinions were written by Justice
Blackmun as dissents or concurrences, together these opinions also
show his devotion to the development of law in a principled way in a
significant area of state-federal relationships.
Under accepted doctrines of preclusion, when issues or claims
have been litigated in one case, the parties are precluded from relitigating them in a subsequent case.' Merger and bar, also known as
claim preclusion or res judicata, prevent a party from bringing a
subsequent suit based upon a claim which has been decided by a
final judgment in an earlier case involving the same parties.' Issue
preclusion or collateral estoppel prevents a party from relitigating an
issue which has already been decided by a court in a case involving
the party to be bound by the judgment.' These doctrines of preclusion have evolved over the years largely in the context of multiple
cases within the same jurisdiction."
* Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University Law School. A.B., 1970; J.D.,
1973, Harvard University. Professor Moore was a law clerk for Justice Blackmun during the
1974 Term.
I wish to thank my research assistant Karen Evans for her able assistance.
1. See generally Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. (4 Otto) 351, 352-53 (1876)
(describing claim and issue preclusion). Issue preclusion requires that the precise issue has
been litigated and determined in the prior case, whereas claim preclusion applies to prevent
subsequent litigation "not only as to every matter which was offered and received to sustain or
defeat the claim or demand, but as to any other admissible matter which might have been
offered for that purpose." Id. at 352.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS 2 (1982) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT SECOND].
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Much more complicated preclusion problems arise when subsequent litigation occurs in a jurisdiction different from the initial forum. When the initial forum is a state court, and preclusion is
sought in a subsequent federal court, issues of federalism, the appropriate roles of the federal and state courts, and specific aspects of
particular federal statutes must be confronted. In this area, Justice
Blackmun has demonstrated his commitment to individual rights, his
appreciation for the real effects of a decision on the lives of the litigants, and his sense of history.'
II.

Allen v. McCurry

An overview of Justice Blackmun's jurisprudence on preclusion
in the state-federal context should begin with his dissenting opinion
in Allen v. McCurry. In this case McCurry was convicted in state
court of possession of heroin and assault with intent to kill. At a
pretrial suppression hearing the trial judge refused to suppress evidence seized in plain view during a warrantless search of a house,
but excluded evidence seized from inside dresser drawers and automobile tires. Because the Fourth Amendment claim had been addressed by the trial court, McCurry could not file a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus in federal court.7 Instead, McCurry filed a
complaint in federal court seeking damages under 42 U.S.C. section
1983 from the officers who had seized the evidence from his home.
He further alleged a conspiracy to violate his Fourth Amendment
rights, an unconstitutional search and seizure, and an assault on him
after his arrest and handcuffing.
In an opinion written by Justice Stewart, the Court concluded
that the normal rules of preclusion should apply in section 1983
5. Since this article focuses on Justice Blackmun's opinions in the area of preclusion in
the state-federal context, it does not deal with all the issues raised by intersystem judicial
preclusion. See generally Robert C. Casad, Symposium: Preclusion in a Federal System, 70
CORNELL L. REV. 599 (198"5) (raising and discussing a number of other preclusion issues in
the state-federal context, e.g., preclusion in diversity cases). Some commentators have denominated the broad problem area as "intersystem preclusion." See, e.g., MAURICE ROSENBERG,
& ROCHELLE COOPER DREYFUSS, ELEMENTS OF CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES AND
MATERIALS 1021 (5th ed. 1990); JOHN J. COUND ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES AND
HANS SMIT

MATERIALS 1215, 1219 (5th ed. 1989); Robert C. Casad, Intersystem Issue Preclusion and the
Restatement (Second) of Judgments, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 510 (1981). Others have utilized
the term "interjurisdictional preclusion." See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, Interjurisdictional
Preclusion and Federal Common Law: Toward a General Approach, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 625
(1985); RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 4, at 3.
6. 449 U.S. 90, 105-16 (1980).
7. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (holding that where the State provides an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, a state prisoner may not be
granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that evidence obtained through an unconstitutional search was introduced at trial).
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suits, notwithstanding the unavailability of federal habeas corpus relief. According to the majority, since McCurry had had one chance
to litigate fully the issue of unconstitutional conduct in the pretrial
suppression hearing in the state criminal trial, he should be precluded from relitigating the issue in the federal section 1983 action. 8
Noting that the federal appellate courts had generally upheld the
applicability of normal preclusion rules to section 1983 cases, the
majority concluded that neither the language of section 1983 nor its
legislative history suggested that Congress intended to restrict the
usual doctrines of preclusion or the normal scope of the Full Faith
and Credit Act, section 1738. 9 The majority read section 1738 as
"specifically requiring all federal courts to give preclusive effect to
state-court judgments whenever the courts of the State from which
the judgments emerged would do so."1O
The majority recognized that Congress intended in section 1983
to change the balance of power between state and federal courts, but
believed that Congress simply intended for the federal courts to operate where the "state courts were unable or unwilling to protect
federal rights."" Where there was a full and fair opportunity to litigate in the state courts, the normal rules of preclusion should apply
in subsequent federal court litigation. The absence of opportunity for
federal habeas review after Stone v. Powell 2 "has no bearing on
section 1983 suits or on the question of the preclusive effect of statecourt judgments."' s
Justice Blackmun's dissent focused on the legislative history of
section 1983, the federal policies fostered by the statute, and the realities of a criminal defendant's posture in the earlier state criminal
litigation. These factors led Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices
Brennan and Marshall, to conclude that the application of issue preclusion here "works injustice on this § 1983 plaintiff, and it makes
more difficult the consistent protection of constitutional rights, a con8. Technically, the Court decided only that the doctrine of issue preclusion was applicable to McCurry's federal § 1983 suit, but it did "not decide how the body of collateral-estoppel doctrine or 28 U.S.C. § 1738 should apply in this case." 449 U.S. at 105 n.25.
9. Id. at 97-98. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1988) provides that "[Jiudicial proceedings [of a
state court] shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United States
and its Territories and Possessions as they have by law or usage in the courts of such State
10. 449 U.S. at 96.
11. Id. at 101; see generally id. at 99-101.
12. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
13. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 103 (1980). Basically the majority believed that
Stone v. Powell involved only issues of federal habeas jurisdiction, and that there was no reason to provide opportunity for federal relitigation after state criminal cases simply because of
the restrictions on criminal defendants' choices. Id. at 103-04.
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sideration that was at the core of the enacters' intent."" Justice
Blackmun's dissenting opinion in Allen demonstrates the key characteristics of his jurisprudence: a devotion to individual rights, an appreciation of the effects of a decision on the real people involved, and
a sense of history.
Justice Blackmun provided a thorough and thoughtful analysis
of the legislative history of section 1983. Because section 1983 is silent regarding the preclusive effects of prior state court judgments,
the Court had previously given substantial weight to the congressional intent."5 In rejecting the view of the majority that the enacting
Congress was concerned simply with assuring procedural regularity,
Justice Blackmun evaluated the legislative history and concluded
that "Congress consciously acted in the broadest possible manner,"1 6
so as to ensure the substantive justice which might not be obtained
in the state courts when constitutional rights were at stake."' In enacting section 1983, Congress intended to provide remedies for constitutional violations not effectively available in state court. Therefore, it was "senseless to suppose that they would have intended the
federal courts to give full preclusive effect to prior state
adjudications.""8
Justice Blackmun also emphasized in his opinion how the preclusion issue in Allen fit within the existing section 1983 jurisprudence. In view of two critically important section 1983 opinions of
the Court, Monroe v. Pape"9 and Mitchum v. Foster,0 Justice
Blackmun emphasized that the purpose of the statute was to restructure federal and state relations, and to provide a remedy regardless
of the circumstances of state law." The only prior precedent of the
Court addressing preclusion in section 1983 cases, England v. Medical Examiners," had permitted preclusion only where "'a party
freely and without reservation submits his federal claims for decision
by the state courts, litigates them there, and has them decided there
. . .'
1-3 Justice Blackmun believed that the majority's approach in
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
U.S. 658
20.
21.
22.
23.
(1964)).

Id. at 106.
Id.
Id. at 109.
Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 106-110 (1980).
Id. at 110.
365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruled in part, Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436
(1978).
407 U.S. 225 (1972).
449 U.S. at I11.
375 U.S. 411 (1964).
449 U.S. at 112 (quoting England v. Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 419
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Allen wrongly abandoned these precedents. 4
After reviewing the principles of preclusion, Justice Blackmun
criticized the majority's emphasis on only one factor-the availability of a full and fair opportunity to litigate an issue in an earlier
case-as necessary to preclude subsequent federal litigation of a section 1983 issue. Instead, Justice Blackmun believed that the doctrines of preclusion did not require such a narrow scope of limita-tions. In light of the policies behind section 1983, he believed that all
relevant factors should be considered in each case before applying
preclusion.2 5 In Allen, a number of factors compelled refusing preclusion. First, since nonmutual collateral estoppel was unknown at
the time of the enactment of section 1983, the enacting Congress
clearly would not have envisioned precluding a criminal defendant
from bringing a subsequent constitutional claim against the police."
Second, the nature of the decisional process in a state criminal trial
differs substantially from that in a section 1983 action. 27 Finally, a
state criminal defendant does not voluntarily choose to litigate the
issue of a Fourth Amendment violation in the state court. Since realistically the state criminal defendant must raise all issues in the
criminal proceeding, he cannot be viewed as freely submitting his
federal claims to the state court for decision. 8 Hence, Justice Blackmun concluded that it is "fundamentally unfair" to require the state
criminal defendant to make an unalterable choice between having
his claim heard in federal court or raising his defense in the state
criminal proceeding against him."
24. 449 U.S. at 112.
25. Id. at 113.
26. Id. at 114-15.
27. Id. at 115. Justice Blackmun noted a number of differences:
The remedy sought in [a § 1983 proceeding] is utterly different. In bringing the
civil suit the criminal defendant does not seek to challenge his conviction collaterally. At most, he wins damages. In contrast, the exclusion of evidence may
prevent a criminal conviction. A trial court, faced with the decision whether to
exclude relevant evidence, confronts institutional pressures that may cause it to
give a different shape to the Fourth Amendment right from what would result in
civil litigation of a damages claim. Also, the issue whether to exclude evidence is
subsidiary to the purpose of a criminal trial, which is to determine the guilt or
innocence of the defendant, and a trial court, at least subconsciously, must weigh
the potential damage to the truth-seeking process caused by excluding relevant
evidence.

Id.
28. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 115 (1980).
29. Id. at 116. His emphasis on fairness for the individual involved is perhaps all the
more significant given his general position in fourth amendment cases. See Stephen L. Wasby,
Justice Harry A. Blackmun in the Burger Court, II HAMLINE L. REV. 183, 212, 235-39
(1988) (describing Justice Blackmun's position in fourth amendment cases). Moreover, Justice
Blackmun had joined the majority in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), holding that a
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Justice Blackmun's dissenting opinion in Allen reflects three
fundamental themes of his jurisprudence. He clearly demonstrates a
commitment to individual rights by emphasizing the broad remedial
purposes of section 1983 and the importance of an individual's ability to raise claims of constitutional violation in federal courts. Moreover, his emphasis on individual rights also reflects a real apprecia-

tion for the individual rights of this specific litigant, and the effects
of this decision on the litigant. He appreciates that a criminal defendant in fact has no choice whether to raise a claim of a Fourth
Amendment violation in a state criminal proceeding; the claim must
be raised or the defendant will face a greater risk of conviction.
Those circumstances in reality mean that the criminal defendant has
not chosen to litigate the issue in state court, and should not be considered to have made a voluntary choice to forego a federal forum. 30
Finally, Justice Blackmun is sensitive to the purposes of section 1983
as revealed by the legislative history and the history of the era in
which it was enacted.

III.

Federated Department Stores, Inc. v. Moitie

Justice Blackmun wrote another opinion addressing preclusion
in the state-federal context in FederatedDepartment Stores, Inc. v.
Moitie.s1 In this case the Court held that a party who has failed to
state court criminal defendant could not raise fourth amendment claims in a subsequent federal habeas case, unless he had been denied any opportunity to litigate in state court.
30. Subsequently, the Court in a unanimous opinion by Justice Marshall in Haring v.
Prosise, 462 U.S. 306 (1983), concluded that where a criminal defendant has pleaded guilty,
and thus had not litigated the validity of a search and seizure, he may file a later action in
federal court under § 1983 raising fourth amendment violations. Justice Marshall stated that
"additional exceptions to collateral estoppel may be warranted in § 1983 actions in light of the
'understanding of § 1983' that 'the federal courts could step in where the state courts were
unable or unwilling to protect federal rights.' " Id. at 313-14 (quoting Allen v. McCurry, 449
U.S. 90, 101 (1980)). In a footnote Justice Marshall also noted that the Court had "recognized various other conditions that must also be satisfied before giving preclusive effect to a
state-court judgment." 462 U.S. at 313 n.7.
In Haring the Court first considered the relevant state law and concluded that the state
courts would not preclude the state criminal defendant who pleaded guilty from subsequently
litigating the validity of the search, and thus that § 1738 would not prevent the § 1983 action.
462 U.S. at 314-17. The Court also determined that it should not create a special federal rule
of preclusion here because the guilty plea did not constitute an admission or waiver of the
fourth amendment claim, and that a rule of preclusion here "would threaten important interests in preserving federal courts as an available forum for the vindication of constitutional
rights," id. at 322, and "would be wholly contrary to one of the central concerns which motivated the enactment of § 1983, namely, the 'grave congressional concern that the state courts
had been deficient in protecting federal rights.'" Id. at 323 (quoting Allen, 449 U.S. at 9899). Since there had not been any adjudication at all of the issues regarding the search which
might provide a basis for the § 1983 claim, the basic theory supporting preclusion, of conserving scarce judicial resources, was inapplicable. 462 U.S. at 322 n.l i.
31. 452 U.S. 394 (1981).
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appeal an initial adverse judgment by a federal court may not relitigate its claim in a subsequent action after other parties had successfully appealed the first judgment.32
In Moitie, Justice Blackmun wrote a concurring opinion in
which he expressed two significant reflections on preclusion doctrine.
First, while agreeing with the result in the case, he criticized the
majority for failing to recognize that there may be some situations
where preclusion doctrine should be tempered by " 'overriding concerns of public policy and simple justice.' -33 He provided examples,
such as where there are unusual procedural complexities, or where
the rights of the various parties are inextricably intertwined, as justification for a nonappealing party avoiding application of preclusion
doctrine. 4 Since those factors were not present in this case, he concurred with the majority opinion barring relitigation of the federal
claims.
Second, in Moitie, Justice Blackmun addressed the relationship
between the federal and state claims. He believed that the state law
claims should be barred from relitigation, just as well as the federal
law claims. 35 Under normal doctrines of claim preclusion, the first
decision precludes future litigation of all matters which might have
been raised in the first suit, whether or not those matters were actually raised, as long as they are related to the same claim which was
32. In Moitie the plaintiffs brought six separate suits in the U.S. district court seeking
treble damages for federal antitrust violations. Moitie's complaint referred only to state law
and was filed in the state court, but the case was removed to federal court and joined with the
others. The U.S. district court dismissed the actions for failure to allege an injury to the plaintiffs' business property. Five plaintiffs appealed, but the plaintiffs in question (Brown and Moitie) instead filed two new actions in state court purporting to raise only state law claims. Since
the new complaints made allegations similar to the initial complaints, the defendants removed
the new cases to the U.S. district court and sought dismissal on the ground of res judicata.
Viewing the complaints as raising "essentially federal law" claims, the district court dismissed,
relying on the doctrine of res judicata. 452 U.S. at 396. Meanwhile the court of appeals had
reversed and remanded the appealed cases. When faced with an appeal in the second Brown
and Moitie cases, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the doctrine of res judicata should be
tempered by public policy and simple justice concerns, and permitted the nonappealing plaintiffs to benefit from the successful appeal of the substantially identical parties. Moitie v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 611 F.2d 1267, 1269-70 (9th Cir. 1980), rev'd, 452 U.S. 394 (1981).
The Supreme Court, in a majority opinion by Justice Rehnquist, concluded that there were no
grounds for exception to the normal rules of preclusion, and that there was "no general equitable doctrine" which would provide an exception to preclusion where another party with similar
claims prevailed on appeal. 452 U.S. at 400. The plaintiffs had made "a calculated choice to
forgo their appeals." Id. at 400-401. The Court refused to consider whether the first suit
should be viewed as preclusive of any possible purely state law claims involved in the second
suit, and simply held that the first suit was res judicata regarding the plaintiffs' federal-law
claims, and reversed and remanded for further proceedings. Id. at 402.
33. 452 U.S. at 403 (quoting Moitie v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 611 F. 2d 1267,
1269 (9th Cir. 1980)).
34. 452 U.S. at 403.
35. Id. at 404. Justice Marshall joined the opinion.
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decided."6 In view of the pendent jurisdiction of the federal court,
the plaintiffs should have raised their state law claims in the first
action, and thus should be barred from litigating the second suit,
whether based on federal or state claims arising out of the
transaction. 7
In Moitie, Justice Blackmun expressed his view that preclusion
doctrine should not be rigidly applied, and that on occasion fundamental justice concerns should overcome traditional principles of
preclusion. Moreover, he considered federalism implications of preclusion in the context of a federal court and its capacity to adjudicate state claims. Unlike the majority, he was willing to conclude
here that prior federal court resolution can have claim preclust'on
effect regarding state law claims which could have been filed in federal court. 8
IV.

Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp.

In Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp.39 the Court again
required a federal court to give preclusive effect to a prior state court
decision. Justice Blackmun once again wrote a strong dissenting
opinion. Kremer involved a discrimination claim that a discharge
and failure to rehire were based on the national origin and religion
of the former employee. Initially Kremer filed a discrimination
charge with the EEOC, which, pursuant to statute, referred the
claim to the relevant state agency.4 9 The state agency determined
that there was no probable cause to believe that the defendant had
engaged in discriminatory practices-a determination which was upheld by the state agency's appeal board as "not arbitrary, capricious
or an abuse of discretion."'" The appeal board's decision was affirmed by the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court.
Kremer requested further action by the EEOC, but a district direc36. Id. Justice Blackmun relied on Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 597 (1948),
and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 61.1 (Tent. Draft No. 5, Mar. 10, 1978). See
also RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 2, at §§ 24-25; 18 CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4406 (1981).
37. Justice Brennan also agreed that the final judgment of the first case precluded relitigation of the same claim on a state law theory. 452 U.S. at 410-11. However, he wrote a
dissenting opinion concluding that the second suit was entirely based on state law, and should
not have been removed to the federal court because of lack of subject matter jurisdiction;
therefore, dismissal on jurisdictional grounds would be appropriate. Id. at 404-05.
38. See infra notes .72-77 and accompanying text (discussing implications of Migra v.
Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75 (1984), for filings in federal court of state
law claims under federal court's pendent jurisdiction).
39. 456 U.S. 461 (1982).
40. Id. at 463-64 (describing statutory framework, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c)).
41. Id. at 464.
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tor of the EEOC found that there was no reasonable cause to believe
the charge of discrimination and issued a right-to-sue notice. 2
Kremer then filed a Title VII action in the U.S. District Court. The

Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice White, affirmed the lower
courts' conclusions that the federal complaint should be dismissed on
grounds of preclusion.'
The majority in Kremer believed that there was no justification
for departing from the usual preclusion rules, or from the requirements of the Full Faith and Credit Act."" Since the decision of the
Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court would preclude
any other action in the New York courts, the majority held that section 1738 precluded any further action in federal court on the same
claim."5 Reading Allen v. McCurry to require an express or implied
partial repeal of section 1738 in subsequent legislation, the majority
concluded that neither the statutory language nor the legislative history demonstrated a "clear and manifest"" intent on the part of
Congress in Title VII to depart from the preclusion requirements of
section 1738.47
In his forceful dissent, Justice Blackmun focused on the structure of Title VII, the legislative history of the statute, the prior Supreme Court jurisprudence analyzing the statute and congressional
intent, the policies involved, and the effects of the Court's decision
42. This is pursuant to the statutory framework, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5f(l) and (3). See
456 U.S. at 465 n.3.
43. 456 U.S. 461 at 485. The Court did not expressly decide whether it was applying
issue or claim preclusion, but stated that both doctrines would effectively bar the subsequent
federal suit. Id. at 481-82 n.22.
44. See supra note 9.
45. 456 U.S. at 466-67.
46. Id. at 485.
47. Id. at 468-76. This approach of the majority has been criticized as an incorrect
interpretation of § 1738. See Stephen B. Burbank, Interjurisdictional Preclusion and Federal
Common Law: Toward A General Approach, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 625, 639 (1985). Professor
Burbank argues that Congress did not choose automatic application of the relevant state's
domestic preclusion laws when it enacted § 1738, and that "[s]tate preclusion rules that are
hostile to or inconsistent with federal substantive policies must yield to federal common law
domestically, and the statute makes the domestic solution binding nationally." Id. at 639-40.
Thus, Professor Burbank would analyze these cases as raising problems of federal common
law. See also Stephen B. Burbank, Afterwords: A Response to ProfessorHazard and a Comment on Marrese, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 659, 665 (1985). Professor Burbank develops his theory more fully in a subsequent article. Stephen B. Burbank, Interjurisdictional Preclusion,
Full Faith and Credit and Federal Common Law: A General Approach, 71 CORNELL L. REV.
733 (1986). But see Gene R. Shreve, Preclusion and Federal Choice of Law, 64 TEXAs L.
REV. 1209, 1228 (1986) (stating that "[it is clear that, subject to constitutional restraints and
the possibility of a statutory exception, section 1738 requires federal courts to give state judgments as much preclusive effect as they would have under state law." (Citations omitted));
David Currie, Res Judicata: The Neglected Defense, 45 U. Cm. L. REV. 317, 326 (1978)
(stating that §1738 requires that law of state rendering judgment be applied in subsequent
federal action).
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on real people who will be trapped by the decision.' 8 Again, Justice
Blackmun demonstrated an appreciation of history, both the history
behind the statute and the precise legislative history, an earnest effort to protect individual rights, and an understanding of the real
effects of the decision upon the claimant.
Examining the structure of the statute, Justice Blackmun concluded that Congress clearly intended that a plaintiff could sue in
federal court despite a finding by a state agency of no discrimination. 9 In 1972, Congress had amended Title VII to provide that the
EEOC should "accord substantial weight to final findings and orders
made by State or local authorities in proceedings commenced under
State or local law." 50 This amendment demonstrated that Congress
intended to permit subsequent suits in federal court, and did not intend to give preclusive effect to the earlier state proceedings." Since
the statute did not differentiate between state agency and state judicial review proceedings, all state findings were simply entitled to substantial weight rather than preclusive effect.52 Moreover, the provision of a federal forum in section 706(c) of Title VII, available
despite termination of state proceedings, would be inconsistent with
a rule of preclusion after state court affirmance of agency action."
Justice Blackmun evaluated the nature of the state court involvement in the review process as essentially the last step of administrative action, rather than a de novo review. 4 In Justice Blackmun's view, preclusive effect was being given to the state agency's
decision that there was not probable cause to believe that discrimination had occurred. Since the standard of review for the state court
was whether the state agency's decision was arbitrary, capricious, or
an abuse of discretion, the state court's decision was not a decision
on the merits of the plaintiff's claim but rather a decision on the
propriety of agency action. Thus, under fundamental principles of
preclusion, since the issues in the state and federal proceedings were
48. 456 U.S. at 486. Justice Blackmun's dissenting opinion was joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall. Justice Stevens wrote a separate dissenting opinion, which largely agreed
with Justice Blackmun. Id. at 508.
49. Id. at 487. Subsequently, in University of Tennessee v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 796
(1986), the Court concluded that "Congress did not intend unreviewed state administrative
proceedings to have preclusive effect on Title VII claims." Justice Blackmun joined Justice
Stevens' opinion dissenting from another aspect of the Court's opinion which required federal
courts to give a state administrative agency's factfinding the same preclusive effect in a subsequent federal § 1983 action that the state courts would afford. Id. at 799.
50. 456 U.S. at 488 (quoting Title VII, § 706(b), codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b)).
51. 456 U.S. at 488.
52. Id. at 489.
53. Id. at 490.
54. Id. at 490-91.
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different, preclusion could not apply."
criticized the Court for

In sum, Justice Blackmun

doing one of two things: either it is granting preclusive effect to
the state agency's decision, a course that it concedes would violate Title VII, or it is misapplying § 1738 by giving preclusive
effect to a state court decision that did not address the issue
before the federal court. Instead of making one of these two mistakes, the Court should accept the fact that the New York state
court judicial review is simply the end
of the state administra56
tive process, the state "proceedings. "
Justice Blackmun also painstakingly examined the legislative
history of Title VII and concluded that this legislative history clearly
established that Congress intended to afford a federal remedy and
did not intend to make state administrative remedies exclusive.6 7 The
legislative history revealed concern about the nature of state agency
proceedings and demonstrated the desire to provide vigorous enforcement of civil rights."
Justice Blackmun based his conclusion in part on prior Supreme
Court decisions which indicated that Congress did not intend that
prior proceedings would automatically preclude a subsequent Title
VII suit.5 9 While not precluding a subsequent federal suit after an
unsuccessful state agency action, the Court's majority would have
precluded a subsequent federal suit after a state court upheld such
agency action as not arbitrary or capricious. This restriction by the
majority disregarded what the Court had previously found to be a
framework of "overlapping, independent, supplementary discrimination remedies." 60
55. Id at 493.
56. 456 U.S. at 494.
57. Id. at 496-97. Justice Blackmun noted that Congress did provide that the EEOC
could enter into worksharing agreements with state agencies, which could provide that complainants could be remitted exclusively to remedies before the state agencies. Id.
58. Id. at 498-501.
59. Four key cases which Justice Blackmun discussed are McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (plaintiff can sue in federal court based on Title VII claim, despite prior EEOC determination of no reasonable cause); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,
415 U.S. 36 (1974) (plaintiff can sue in federal court despite prior adverse arbitration under
collective bargaining agreement); Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454
(1975) (Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 provide separate and distinct remedies for discrimination); and Chandler v. Roudebush, 425 U.S. 840 (1976) (plaintiff can bring Title VII suit
despite prior Civil Service Commission affirmance of federal agency's rejection of discrimination claim).
60. Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 502 (1982). Justice Blackmun
-cited the language of Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47-48 (1974) (emphasis
added by Justice Blackmun):
[Llegislative enactments in this area have long evinced a general intent to
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Finally Justice Blackmun described the real effects of the
Court's decision. In view of the majority opinion, Justice Blackmun
argued, a prudent complainant should avoid state court review of
state agency action. If the complainant seeks state court review and
loses, he will be precluded from a successful suit in federal court.
But if the complainant foregoes state court review, he can go to the
EEOC and then to federal court, where he will receive a de novo
trial with the benefits of federal procedure. This elimination of the
review by state courts will have the ironic effect of weakening the
quality of state agency decisionmaking, as well as diminishing the
importance of state courts. 1 Moreover, for complainants who are
unaware of the majority's rule, the decision to seek state court review will bar the federal forum. Justice Blackmun eloquently described their plight:
[T]he Court, for a small class of discrimination complainants,
has undermined the remedial purpose of Title VII. Invariably,
there will be some complainants who will not be aware of today's decision. The Court has thus constructed a rule that will
serve as a trap for the unwary pro se or poorly represented complainant. For these complainants, their sole remedy lies in the
state administrative processes

. . .

the nature of the agency's de-

liberations combined with deferential judicial review can lead
only to discrimination charges receiving less careful consideration than Congress intended when it passed Title VII. The
Court's decision thus cannot be squared with the congressional
intent that the fight
against discrimination be a policy "of the
2
highest priority.

accord parallel or overlapping remedies against discrimination ....
Title VII
provides for consideration of employment-discrimination claims in several forums. . .. And, in general, submission of a claim to one forum does not preclude a later submission to another. Moreover, the legislative history of Title
VII manifests a congressional intent to allow an individual to pursue independently his rights under both Title VII and other applicable state and federal
statutes.
456 U.S. at 502-03.
61. Id. at 504-05. Justice Blackmun described this as "a perverse sort of comity that
eliminates the reviewing function of state courts in the name of giving their decisions due
respect." Id. at 505. Moreover, he states that "[iln this case, the Court has chosen preclusion
over common sense, with the result that the state courts will decline, not grow, in importance."
Id. at 506.
62. Id. at 506-07. Cf. Note, The Changing Social Vision of Justice Blackmun, 96
HARV. L. REV. 717, 731-32 (1983). The note cites Kremer in support of the proposition that
"Justice Blackmun has repeatedly depicted in recent years a vision of aggrieved individuals
threatened with losing their way in a legal maze. Such a perception has helped to generate
doctrinal positions that seek to preserve the availability of legal resources and the judicial
machinery." Id. at 731.

PRECLUSION IN THE STATE-FEDERAL CONTEXT

Given the nature of administrative decisionmaking in the area of discrimination, previously recognized by the Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp.,6 and the deferential nature of state court review, Justice

Blackmun concluded that the Court's decision would restrict the
availability of Title VII relief. Such a restriction is unwarranted; the
text, legislative history, and policies embodied in the statute "demonstrate that Congress contemplated relitigation of a discrimination
claim in federal court, even though a state court had refused to disturb a state agency decision adverse to the complainant."'"
Justice Blackmun's approach in Kremer thus combined the
three focal points of his analysis: a thorough grounding in the legislative history and policy of the statute (Title VII); an evaluation of
the implications for effectuation of individual rights; and a recognition and description of the real effects of the decision on individuals.
He concluded that preclusion is wrong here: not only did Congress
intend to afford a federal remedy, but that remedy is important in
effectuating full consideration of Title VII claims and in avoiding
procedural traps for unwary or poorly advised litigants.
V.

Migra v. Warren City School District Board of Education

In 1984 Justice Blackmun wrote the opinion for the unanimous
Court in Migra v. Warren City School District Board of Education.16 In Migra, the Court held that a plaintiff who lost a state
court action raising state law claims may be barred under claim preclusion doctrines from bringing a subsequent suit in federal court
which raises claims pertaining to the same transaction. This decision
may seem to conflict with Justice Blackmun's previous dissents discussed above, but is in fact consistent with his prior views and continues to reflect the themes emphasized in this article.
Migra, whose employment was not renewed by the school
board, brought suit in state court, claiming breach of contract by the
63. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). This case was described by Justice Blackmun in Kremer, 456
U.S. at 502.
64. Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 508 (1982). Justice Blackmun
carefully distinguished the situation involved in Kremer from a case where a state court had
held a trial on the merits; in the latter case preclusion would apply. Id. Moreover, he noted
that even a state court's affirmance of a state agency's decision could be admitted into evidence
and accorded substantial (but not preclusive) weight. Id.
Subsequently, Justice Blackmun reiterated his view that Kremer impermissibly restricts
effectuation of the congressional purpose of Title VII, and will result in avoidance of state
courts by well-advised plaintiffs. Consolidated Foods Corp. v. Unger, 456 U.S. 1002, 1003-04
(1982) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in remand for reconsideration in light of Kremer, but restating his objections to Kremer).
65. 465 U.S. 75 (1984).
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school board and wrongful interference with her contract by the individual members of the board. The state court did not decide issues
of conspiracy or individual member liability, but ruled that there was
a binding contract which entitled Migra to reinstatement and compensatory damages. Migra successfully sought the state trial court to
dismiss without prejudice the conspiracy and individual member liability issues. 6 Migra then filed suit in the U.S. district court against
the school board, its individual members, and the superintendent of
schools. She argued that her contract was not renewed because she
had exercised her First Amendment rights, that she had been deprived of property without due process, and that she had been denied
equal protection. Invoking 42 U.S.C. sections 1983 and 1985, Migra
sought injunctive relief, and compensatory and punitive damages.
The district court granted summary judgment on the basis of preclu67
sion, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed.
The issue for the Court in Migra was whether claim preclusion
should apply to bar a subsequent federal section 1983 suit after state
court litigation of related state law claims-an issue expressly left
unresolved in Allen v. McCurry.6 8 Despite the potential awkwardness involved in his prior role as chief dissenter in Allen, Justice
Blackmun accurately reflected both the majority and dissenting
views in Allen, placed Migra in context, and applied precedent in
conjunction with his own analytical framework.
Justice Blackmun began with the principles established by the
majorities in Allen and Kremer that the Full Faith and Credit Act,
section 1738, requires that a subsequent federal court give the same
preclusive effect to a prior state court judgment that the state court
would give to its own prior judgment.69 In Allen this general rule
was applied to require issue preclusion in a subsequent federal section 1983 suit. The majority in Allen did not believe that either the
language or the legislative history of section 1983 demonstrated an
66. The trial judge's decision was affirmed by the Ohio Court of Appeals, and review
was denied by the Ohio Supreme Court. Id. at 79.
67. Id. at 80.
68. 449 U.S. at 97 n.10.
69. 465 U.S. at 81. As discussed above, these are decisions with which Justice Blackmun
fundamentally disagreed. However, Justice Blackmun in Migra wrote the opinion for the
Court, in light of the existing precedents of Allen aid Kremer. Professor Robert Smith raises
the question whether Migra "could be read to go even further [than Allen and Kremer] in its
apparent reliance on a literal interpretation of section 1738." Robert H. Smith, Full Faith and
Credit and Section 1983: A Reappraisal, 63 N. C. L. REV. 59, 79 (1984). He then explains
that there was no occasion for the Court in Migra to develop exceptions to the application of
state law in determining claim preclusion, id. at 79-81, and he argues that Migra and the
other precedents permit flexibility in developing exceptions that will allow the courts to accommodate § 1983 policies in individual cases. Id. at 106-123.

PRECLUSION IN THE STATE-FEDERAL CONTEXT

intent to depart from the normal rules of preclusion. In light of Allen, Justice Blackmun wrote in Migra: "[i]t is difficult to see how
the policy concerns underlying section 1983 would justify a distinction between the issue preclusive and claim preclusive effects of

state-court judgments."7 Since issue preclusion and claim preclusion
implicate similar concerns in section 1983 litigation, Justice Blackmun concluded that the decision in Allen logically permitted the application of claim preclusion in subsequent section 1983 cases in federal court.7
Justice Blackmun also considered Migra's argument that to
deny claim preclusive effect would be advantageous in permitting litigants to bring state claims in state court and federal claims in federal court. He determined that the Full Faith and Credit Act emphasized respect for state court judgments, and was not designed
simply to provide alternative fora for state and federal claims. He
stated, "[t]Iis reflects a variety of concerns, including notions of
comity, the need to prevent vexatious litigation, and a desire to conserve judicial resources.""
Finally, he pointed out that Migra had the initial free choice of
whether to sue in state or federal court, and that a state court could
have adjudicated her federal claims. Alternatively, unlike McCurry
who had been a criminal defendant in the state court in Allen 7 3
Migra could have proceeded first in federal court. Under these circumstances, Justice Blackmun concluded that it is appropriate to al70. Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 83 (1984).
71. Id. at 84. In light of the resolution by the Court of the earlier cases, the real question remaining in Migra was simply whether there is a basis for treating claim preclusion
differently from issue preclusion in § 1983 cases, or whether there were any other factors
which would justify a different approach in Migra. Criticism of Migra for failing to appreciate
the legislative history of § 1983 misses the mark-that issue was resolved adversely by the
majority in Allen. Cf. Leanne B. De Vos, Comment, Claim Preclusion and Section 1983 Civil
Rights Actions: Migra v. Warren City School District Board of Education, 70 IowA L. REV.
287, 295-300 (1984). Notwithstanding Justice Blackmun's conviction expressed in his earlier
dissenting opinions that the majority was wrong in Allen, his approach in Migra reflects respect for the principle of stare decisis and for precedent. But cf. supra note 64.
72. 465 U.S. at 84. Again this emphasis on the application of § 1738 reflects the weight
of the Court's prior majority opinions in Allen and Kremer.
73. It is primarily at this point that Justice Blackmun noted his prior opinion dissenting
in Allen. He described his opinion there as heavily influenced by the posture of the § 1983
plaintiff in the prior state litigation as a criminal defendant, and distinguished Migra as one
who was in control in determining where she wished to file suit initially. He also pointed out
that if suit is initially filed in federal court, and the federal court abstains from ruling on
federal claims pending state court resolution of state claims, a plaintiff can preserve her right
to federal court resolution of the federal claims, citing England v. Louisiana State Bd. of
Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411 (1964). 465 U.S. at 85 n.7. In England the Court distinguished the situation where a party voluntarily submits her entire case, including federal
claims, to the state court. 375 U.S. at 418-19.
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low claim preclusion to apply in the subsequent federal court section
1983 action. The Court held that the "state-court judgment in this
litigation has the same claim preclusive effect in federal court that
the judgment would have in the Ohio state courts." '
Thus in Migra, Justice Blackmun demonstrated his ability to
resolve new cases in light of existing precedent, even that with which
he strongly disagreed. Justice Blackmun believed that the majority's
decision in Allen was wrong because it fundamentally misconstrued
the nature of section 1983, congressional intent, and the effects on
real people and on individual rights. However, in light of the majority in Allen, he acknowledged the logical implications of that decision in the related area of claim preclusion. He analyzed the posture
of the plaintiff, and the real choices that she had, which were totally
different from those of the criminal defendant in Allen. The civil
plaintiff in Migra, unlike the criminal defendant in Allen or even the
Title VII claimant in Kremer, had an unfettered initial choice
whether to sue in state court or in federal court, and both fora could
resolve all of her related claims. Thus, Justice Blackmun concluded
that, in light of precedent and the posture of the parties, application
of claim preclusion was warranted.
This decision in Migra may result in more section 1983 litigation filed in federal court. After Migra, parties must go to federal
court first if they seek a federal forum, rather than going to state
court first on their state claims and waiting until later to obtain, if
74. The case was.remanded for a determination whether the Ohio courts would apply
claim preclusion in this context, since the federal courts should apply "Ohio state preclusion
law." 465 U.S. at 87. Justice White wrote a concurring opinion indicating that if he were
deciding the matter anew, he would permit a federal court to give greater preclusive effect to a
state court judgment than the state court would. Id. at 88. Justice White later joined a majority opinion holding that state preclusion principles should be considered in determining the
preclusive effect of a prior state court judgment on a subsequent federal antitrust suit, and
rejecting the notion that the federal courts should give greater preclusive effect than a state
court would to its own prior judgment. Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373 (1985) (Opinion of the Court by Justice O'Connor; Justice Blackmun did
not participate in the consideration or decision of the case).
In Marrese the Court held that normally under § 1738 state preclusion law should first
be considered to determine whether the state courts would apply preclusion principles, even
where the subsequent federal antitrust claim could only be heard in federal court. Id. at 37986. Only if the state courts would apply preclusion would the federal court need to determine
whether an exception to § 1738 should exist to prevent claim preclusion in subsequent cases
within the exclusive federal court jurisdiction for antitrust cases. Id. at 386. The Court also
stated: "[w]e therefore reject a judicially created exception to § 1738 that effectively holds as
a matter of federal law that a plaintiff can bring state law claims initially in state court only at
the cost of forgoing subsequent federal antitrust claims." Id. Since usually courts do not apply
preclusion to matters that for jurisdictional reasons could not have been raised in an initial
suit, it is likely that in most states there would not be claim preclusion in these circumstances.
See id. at 382; RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 4, at § 26(l)(c).

PRECLUSION IN THE STATE-FEDERAL CONTEXT

necessary, resolution of federal claims in federal court. In order to
prevent claim preclusion of state law claims, those state law claims
must be raised in federal court under pendent jurisdiction. 5 However, these are simply the results of the federal structure, and of the
Court's decision in Allen that the legislative history of section 1983
does not provide an exception to the mandate of preclusion found in
section 1738.1 Moreover, the result of Migra of encouraging plaintiffs with section 1983 actions to file first in federal court is consistent with Justice Blackmun's overall views of the importance of section 1983 in providing a federal forum.7
It is interesting to compare Justice Blackmun's decision applying claim preclusion in Migra with an earlier decision which he
wrote for the Court refusing to apply claim preclusion in a statefederal context. In Brown v. Felsen,7 Justice Blackmun concluded in
a unanimous opinion for the Court that a federal bankruptcy court
could consider extrinsic evidence in adjudicating whether a debt,
which was previously reduced to judgment in a state court proceeding, was dischargeable under section 17 of the Bankruptcy Act.7 9
The Court believed in this case "that neither the interests served by
res judicata, the process of orderly adjudication in state courts, nor
the policies of the Bankruptcy Act would be well served by foreclosing petitioner from. submitting additional evidence to prove his
80
case."
Several factors were critical to the Court's decision in Brown to
permit a guarantor, who had obtained a prior state court judgment
against a debtor, to raise in the subsequent federal bankruptcy court
proceeding issues of fraud and deceit of the debtor in obtaining the
guarantee. First, the guarantor was not attempting to challenge the
75. See generally 13B CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCE§ 3567.1 (1984). Certain pendent claims may not be able to be raised in federal court.
See, e.g., Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984) (Eleventh Amendment prevents federal court injunction of state officers to enforce state claims).
76. Cf. De Vos, supra note 71, at 310 (criticizing Migra, for, inter alia, producing more
federal court litigation).
77. In addition to the cases in which Justice Blackmun has expressed an expansive view
of § 1983, many of which are discussed supra, an article written by Justice Blackmun also
demonstrates his view of the importance of § 1983 in assuring the "commitment of our society
to be governed by law and to protect the rights of those without power against oppression at
the hands of the powerful." Harry A. Blackmun, Section 1983 and Federal Protection of
Individual Rights-Will the Statute Remain Alive or Fade Away?, 60 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1, 28
(1985).
78. 442 U.S. 127 (1979).
79. 11 U.S.C. § 35, Act of Oct. 19, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-467, 84 Stat. 990 (repealed
1978).
80. 442 U.S. at 132.
DURE
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validity of the prior state court judgment, but rather to respond to
the initiative taken by the debtor to obtain a discharge in bankruptcy."1 Second, the issues in the bankruptcy litigation were different from issues involved in the state litigation, and it was unlikely
that litigants would raise issues which might arise only if a bankruptcy were filed.8 2 Third, Congress intended to provide a federal
forum of the federal bankruptcy court to resolve these section 17
issues. Although Congress had not spoken expressly on the issue, "it
would be inconsistent with the philosophy of the 1970 amendments
to adopt a policy of res judicata which takes these section 17 questions away from the [federal] bankruptcy courts and forces them
back into state courts." 83 Finally, although the failure to litigate
fraud and deceit in state court might preclude claims in state court
for extraordinary remedies such as exemplary damages, the failure
to litigate such issues should not prevent recovery on the debt when a
subsequent bankruptcy proceeding is filed by the debtor in federal
court.8 4 Thus the Court determined that the prior state court judgment adjudicating the existence of a debt did not preclude the guarantor from raising issues of the debtor's fraud in a subsequent federal bankruptcy proceeding brought by the debtor.
Justice Blackmun's opinion in Brown did not refer to section
1738.85 It focused instead on the purposes of the federal bankruptcy
statute. The decision is premised on the concept, developed later in
Justice Blackmun's and other Justices' opinions, that a subsequent
statutory enactment, such as the bankruptcy statute here, may explicitly or implicitly provide exceptions to section 1738. Alternatively, the decision may be premised on a theory that federal law
guides preclusion decisions in federal court and that such federal law
may be an amalgam of federal statutory and federal common law.
Brown, of course, preceded Allen by a year, and it was Allen which
established the majority view that section 1738 generally requires
application of state preclusion law-a view which was then applied
to the question of claim preclusion in Migra.
81.
82.

Id. at 133.

Id. at 135.
83. 442 U.S. at 136. See also id. at 138 (summarizing legislative history demonstrating
congressional intent to have bankruptcy court resolve these issues).
84. Id. at 137-38. The Court explicitly limited the decision to claim preclusion. If the
state litigation had actually determined fraud, a different question, that of issue preclusion,
would be implicated. The Court did not decide the question of issue preclusion. Id. at 139
n.10.
85. The parties made no mention of § 1738 in their briefs to the Court. See Brief for
the Petitioner, Brief for the Respondent, and Reply Brief for the Petitioner, Brown v. Felsen,

442 U.S. 127 (1979) (No. 78-58).

PRECLUSION IN THE STATE-FEDERAL CONTEXT

Justice Blackmun's opinion for the Court in Brown demonstrated many of the same traits observed above in his preclusion
opinions involving section 1983 actions. Recognizing the purposes of
preclusion doctrine,8 6 he evaluated the application of the doctrine in
the particularly significant federalism context where the initial litigation occurs in state court and is followed by litigation in federal
court on federal issues. He addressed relevant federal legislation and
its legislative history to determine whether there are express or implied federal interests which warrant exception from the normal doctrines of preclusion. Moreover, he considered the plight of the actual
litigants, and the real effects that alternative preclusion holdings
would have on their conduct.
VI.

Conclusion

The application of preclusion doctrine in the state-federal context might be considered to be a dry and difficult area, fraught with
extraordinarily technical issues. In recent years, however, this has
proved to be an area of intersection and conflict between important
policies expressed in federal statutes, such as section 1983 and Title
VII, and principles motivating preclusion, whether expressed in common law doctrines of preclusion or in the interpretation of section
1738. In the three key cases, Allen, Kremer, and Migra, Justice
Blackmun developed his analysis of whether preclusion was proper,
demonstrating his commitment to the three central themes of his jurisprudence. Justice Blackmun explained his analysis of the legislative history of the relevant statutes, his sense of the history of the era
in which each statute was enacted, and his understanding of the importance of the resolution of the preclusion problem in a fashion consistent with the policies motivating the statute. His appreciation of
history is apparent. These cases also reflect the importance of individual rights in Justice Blackmun's jurisprudence; he is concerned
that litigants have a fair and adequate opportunity to litigate their
constitutional rights. Finally, these cases demonstrate Justice Blackmun's attention to actual outcomes. He is concerned with what will
happen to real individuals as a result of the decision.
Justice Blackmun's positions in Migra, Allen, and Kremer also
reflect the importance of party choice. In Allen, the state criminal
defendant had no real choice whether to litigate in state court, and
application of preclusion doctrine constituted a particularly great in86. "Res judicata thus encourages reliance on judicial decisions, bars vexatious litigation, and frees the courts to resolve other disputes." 442 U.S. at 131.
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fringement of his rights afforded by section 1983 to litigate in a federal court. In contrast, in Migra, the plaintiff in federal court had
been the plaintiff in state court, had exercised the initial choice of
forum, and could have raised both state and federal law claims initially in a single federal court action. In such a situation it is appropriate to accomodate the tension between policies of affording a federal forum for section 1983 cases and principles of preclusion
expressed through section 1738. The initial party choice of a state
court forum may result in subsequent exclusion from the federal
courts on a claim involved in the same transaction. The results
reached by Justice Blackmun in these three key cases illustrate his
approach to jurisprudence. They are also eminently sensible and reflect both a sensitivity to individual rights and an awareness of the
impact on litigants.

